This monograph examines time estimation at the operational level of war. The study begins with a review of Classical Military Theory to identify the theoretical basis for time estimation. It next examines the Theory of Operational Art to discern significant differences between it and classical theory. This theoretical basis is used as a foundation to examine current approved doctrine relating to operational art focusing specifically on tasks requiring the estimation of time. The next chapter provides two historical case studies of failed time estimation: Napoleon's 1812 Campaign in Russia, and France's defeat in 1940. These historical examples illustrate the criticality of achieving harmony between the time-space-force calculations made by the commander and the nature of the conflict being fought. Organizations, processes, and technical means define the set of resources available to the commander for this task. Should those tools be inappropriate to the nature or level of the conflict, failure is a likely result. The monograph asserts that operational art is quantitatively and qualitatively removed from classical warfare. The core of its unique nature lies in its requirement for the arrangement in time and space of simultaneous and sequential military operations using discrete air, land, sea, and space forces. Time-space-force considerations at the operational level of war are therefore multi-dimensional. The tools of the operational artist should therefore be designed to support decision making in this environment. The study concludes that adequate tools to assist operational commanders in estimating time-space-force requirements do not exist. It argues that failure to develop such dedicated tools is likely to force operational commanders to use tools developed to support tactical vice operational level decisionmaking. The use of such single dimension tools is not likely to answer the operational commander's time-space-force questions or provide the foundation for planning future operations; they may, in fact, prove dangerous. The study recommends that Joint and Service studies be conducted to develop useful tools which would support operational level decisionmaking, in general, and time estimation, in particular. Furthermore, it suggests that the nature of warfare is undergoing revolutionary changes today which may render current concepts obsolete. It argues for a priority study to assess the effects of the Microelectronic and Informational Revolutions on the nature of war, and especially, upon time-space-force considerations. It also recommends creation of a Joint School of Advanced Military Studies, argues for development of a comprehensive theory of conflict, and calls for greater emphasis on the development of Joint doctrine.

ADA 234000 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)