This monograph discusses the proper doctrine for current heavy forces in Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT). The urban warfare concepts found in classical military theory, modern military theory, history, and contemporary analysis are examined to develop a set of propositions for current heavy force MOUT doctrine. Present U.S. Army MOUT doctrine for heavy forces is compared to these propositions to determine the adequacy and validity of current doctrine. This paper concludes with implications for the U.S. Army today based on its heavy force MOUT doctrine. Among the many conclusions which are drawn from this investigation is that current doctrine for heavy forces in MOUT should contain the following four propositions: 1) The attack of an urban area is a time consuming operation. 2) In most cases, the attacker should attempt to avoid combat in urban terrain. 3) Combined arms (including dismounted infantry and armored vehicles with large caliber, direct fire weapons) are necessary for successful MOUT operations. 4) The urban defender should have a counterattack capability. Present Army MOUT doctrine adequately addresses only Proposition 2. The study concludes that major discrepancies exist between the MOUT doctrine expounded in the Army's umbrella MOUT manual, FM 90-10, and the heavy force how-to-fight manuals for battalions through corps. Improving the doctrine is the first step to enhancing the Army's ability to conduct heavy force operations in MOUT.

ADA 234969 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)