This monograph examines two of the assumptions which underlie the Joint Chiefs of Staff support planning model as they relate to sustainment of Army forces in a unified command's wartime campaign. One is that lines of communication (LOCs) are secure. The second assumption is that an intratheater means of distribution exists, which is normally associated with ports, airfields, roads, and railroads, and their operating units. These two assumptions are analyzed using theoretical, doctrinal, and historical criteria. The analysis shows that secure LOCs and infrastructural capabilities are absolute requirements to sustain Army forces in a unified command's wartime campaign. The analysis also indicates that infrastructural requirements vary greatly between theaters. For operational planners, the findings have six implications. One, planning branches are needed that assume LOCs are not secure or that LOC security is lost during the campaign. Two, planners have responsibilities for securing both intratheater and intertheater LOCs. Three, securing LOCs may subtract from the forces available to theater planners while permitting the enemy additional time to strengthen his position. Four, careful comparison of the infrastructure's capabilities with the operational scheme is required for sustainment of the latter; this comparison is often difficult. Five, units essential to the supply distribution system should be among the first to deploy to a theater of war or theater of operations. And six, planners must recognize the infrastructure's current and future limiting factors and devise plans for their minimization. For a less forward deployed Army, the analytical results firstly imply that Pre-positioned Organizational Material Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS) stocks will become increasingly important to rapid reinforcement of the unified commands. Secondly, diverting reinforcements to the battle for LOC security, an historically common occurrence, will have relatively greater impact on unified commands' operational plans. Thirdly, proportionally fewer combat service support units critical to rapid reinforcement than combat units should be withdrawn from theaters with forward deployed forces. The requirements for secure LOCs and a theater infrastructure are the essence of sustainment of theater Army forces. The art lies in campaign design and execution that achieves them.

ADA 235124 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)