This monograph examines rear area terrain management of armored and mechanized brigades. The study focuses on overcrowding, which can result from poor terrain management, as it relates to the brigade's warfighting capability. The specific research question is: How is a brigade's ability to generate combat power affected by overcrowding in the brigade rear area? The monograph first establishes which units may locate in the brigade rear area, how they contribute to combat power generation, and their siting considerations. Next, the conditions that may cause overcrowding are described. The relationship between overcrowding and combat power generation is then established using as criteria Colonel Huba Wass de Czege's Combat Power Model. Three alternatives are analyzed for relieving overcrowded conditions. The study concludes with two implications for the U.S. Army. First, brigade rear area terrain management deserves attention in Field Manual 71-3, Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade. The manual currently offers scant coverage of terrain management, leaving unaddressed the potential causes of overcrowding and its effects on combat power generation. Second, division and corps headquarters must actively participate in brigade rear area terrain management. Divisions and corps can contribute to overcrowding to such an extent that their involvement is necessary to prevent or reduce it. The monograph includes several noteworthy findings: There are at least as many combat and combat support units in the brigade rear area as combat service support units. The most likely cause of overcrowding is operational plans. Divisions and corps can contribute significantly to overcrowding. Overcrowding degrades the ability of brigades, and thus divisions and corps, to generate combat power. Relieving overcrowding is possible with existing resources.

ADA 225470 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)