With the current fielding of the AH-64 Apache and the Light Helicopter (LH) on the horizon, Army aviation will possess some of the finest tools of war ever known to mankind. To capitalize on our quality equipment, we must develop sound doctrine with organizations capable of performing required missions. AirLand Battle Future (ALBF), the concept which prescribes how the Army will fight battles into the 21st century, proposes consolidating heavy corps attack helicopter assets into an aviation division. The proposed aviation division represents a major leap in the evolution of attack helicopter organizational models. This study analyzes how that proposed organization meets the requirements of the AirLand Battle Future "deep battle." Specifically, what tactical implications on the deep battle arise if we consolidate attack helicopter assets of a heavy corps into an aviation division? The effort to determine the best aviation organization to conduct deep battle in concert with the ALBF concept begins with an outline of the fundamental theoretical issues of deep battle. Second, evaluation of historical examples of the successful employment of attack helicopters in a nonlinear battlefield aid in developing insights that may be applicable to the ALBF concept. Third, a critical comparison of current, decentralized attack helicopter organizations and the centralized attack helicopter organization of the Proposed ALBF aviation division determines their strengths and weaknesses. Each will be evaluated in a southwest Asia scenario against the Battlefield Operating Systems of maneuver, command and control, intelligence, and combat service support. Finally, conclusions will be drawn from the analysis and appropriate recommendations made. This monograph finds that while providing a better alternative than the current organizational model, the proposed aviation division has many shortcomings for conducting deep attacks under the ALBF concept. The nonlinear battlefield and extended area of operations provide unique challenges. This study identifies many areas of concern such as lack of fire support and a ground maneuver force. After a detailed analysis of both organizational models, neither truly meets the requirements of the ALBF concept. Conclusions of this study indicate that the Army should continue to study the consolidation of attack helicopters into an air attack division as it appears to offer tactical advantages over the current attack helicopter force structure or the proposed aviation division. Employing the air attack division, the corps commander will be able to use decisive aerial maneuver to destroy enemy forces and shape the close fight. For the first time, the corps commander has the opportunity to employ sufficient organic aerial maneuver forces to fight and win the deep battle.

ADA 248502 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)