Recent historical events such as the crumbling of the Berlin Wall and Operation Desert Storm indicate that we are entering a new era of geo-political struggle. The world is no longer dominated by a bipolar struggle between the United States and the USSR. In the new world order the U.S. finds itself in a leadership role within a multipolar community of nations. One outcome of this new world order may be the emergence of regional conflicts which might not have occurred in a bipolar world. A regional aggressor's use of the defense may pose unique challenges to a U.S. operational commander charged with deploying/employing offensive military power to secure or protect U.S. interests. This study will examine the doctrinal implications the defense would place on a U.S. operational commander's ability to deploy/employ military power to resolve regional conflict. This study begins with a description of Clausewitz' theory of the superiority of the defense to clarify and explain Clausewitz' criteria. These criteria are: preservation of one's force, the advantages of time, position, surprise, and of counterattacking from interior lines. Clausewitz' criteria will be applied to historical case studies to determine how theory was applied in practice. The study then analyzes the findings to draw doctrinal implications about the defense as a strategy for Third World nations to secure regional goals. The analysis will conclude by providing doctrinal challenges which may affect the United States' conduct of operational art in the new world order. This study highlights the difficulty of applying theory to practice -- particularly when the defense already presupposes weakness in the force adopting it. While the defense may, in the right hands and under the right circumstances, be the stronger form of war -- wars are still won by offensive action. Nonetheless, U.S. operational commanders will face formidable challenges for regional war. The implications drawn from this study suggest that a careful evaluation of current doctrine is required to ensure that it meets the challenges of the new world order.

ADA 240412 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)