The purpose of this monograph is to determine how operational pauses can be best sequenced in order to minimize the effects of culmination on the AirLand Battle battlefield. This study focuses at the operational level and joint operations. My methodology began by examining the theoretical and doctrinal foundation for pauses in major operations. This section concluded with a derived definition of operational pauses. I then examined three case studies, two from World War II and Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, to see how operational pauses were used to minimize the effects of culmination. I then assessed the effectiveness of these pauses using as criteria three operational operating systems--maneuver and mobility, firepower, and protection. Finally, I make some conclusions on how operational pauses can be best sequenced during joint operations to minimize the effects of culmination. This monograph concludes that while the term "operational pause" has become a part of our operational vernacular, it remains undefined in our doctrine. I provide a proposed definition of the term and show how it can serve as a tool for the operational commander in designing the conduct of his campaign plans. When properly employed, an operational pause allows an operational commander to retain the initiative on the battlefield by shifting his main effort from one service component to another. This monograph concludes with some proposed subjects for further study on the concept of operational pauses.

ADA 243342 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)