The conduct of war throughout its evolution has become increasingly complex, especially given the range, accuracy, and lethality of modern weapons systems. In order to maximize the contributions of firepower within the overall operational concept, operational fires must be a fully integrated component of campaign design. Doctrinally, there is no designated individual or associated staff section to assume responsibility for the planning and execution of operational fires. Draft joint doctrine suggests that responsibility for this may be given to the component commander with the preponderance of fire support assets. Joint doctrine also states that a Joint Targeting Coordination Board, operating as a joint fire support element, may be organized to coordinate the myriad of fire support functions at the operational level. This doctrinal guidance relegates this vital component of campaign design to, at best, an ad hoc organization. The study proposes to answer the question: Is a joint fire support element required to integrate operational fires within a campaign plan? Classical and contemporary theory are first examined discussing the relationship of operational fires to operational art. Next, several major operations are examined tracing the evolution of operational fires emphasizing the fire support coordination processes--the disaster at Kasserine Pass in North Africa, Operations STRANGLE and DIADEM in Italy, Operations OVERLORD and COBRA in Normandy, and Operation STRANGLE in Korea, and the birth of a unified command structure in MacArthur's Far East Command. Existing operational joint doctrine and relevant service doctrine are examined for its sufficiency. The evidence is filtered through a lens provided by the imperatives of joint fire support: command involvement, mission focus, unity of effort, aggressive intelligence, and timely effect. The study concludes that planning for the integration of operational fires is best accomplished by a permanent joint force fire support element (JFFSE). The JFFSE fully develops the JFC's guidance and intent for the desired impact of operational fires and recommends to the JFC how attack and intelligence resources should be allocated. Through the use of a decision support template, and working closely with the J-2 and J-3, the JFFSE determines what the fires are to achieve and when the fires will most likely be employed. This information is passed to the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) who is vested with the authority to direct and coordinate all efforts concerned with the application of operational fires. Technological developments in delivery means, precision munitions, command and control, and accurate target acquisition, demonstrate that operational fires may move from a supporting role to become a more decisive element of combat power as prophesied by the AirLand Battle-Future concept.

ADA 240177 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)