This monograph examines under what circumstances, if at all, an air campaign can achieve decisive results independent of other forces. The recent war in the Persian Gulf has given the research question its immediate significance. Given the unprecedented nature of the allied aerial campaign against Iraq, was it reasonable to expect that the air war could force a politically acceptable decision without the need to commit US forces to a potentially costly and unneeded ground campaign? The problem is also relevant to future US doctrinal development. AirLand Battle Future is the operational concept that is expected to evolve into US Army doctrine for the 21st century. A key portion of this concept is the targeting and the destruction of the enemy by long-range air forces. Ground maneuver is conceived as a "mopping-up" phase. The current and future relevance of this problem is part of a developing historical pattern in US military thought. There is a tension in US military thought and practice between the imperative of quick decisive results and the desire to minimize casualties. Since the advent of air power, air forces have seemed to offer a convenient answer to this dilemma. The question thus calls for a reexamination of the fundamental relationship between air and ground forces. Under what circumstances, can decisive results be attained at the operational level of war, with air power alone. This study sought to answer the research question through the use of historical examples analyzed by an appropriate criterion. The criterion, selected from FM 100-5, gave a doctrinal and theoretical framework for the historical analysis. A synthesis of the analysis led to conclusions concerning the role of selecting the appropriate campaign end state, the sequencing of actions over space and time, and the allocation and synchronization of force types, in the creation of circumstances conducive to decisive air operations. These conclusions are applied to a tentative analysis of the Persian Gulf War and the AirLand Battle Future operational concept.

ADA 243327 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)