The United States has possessed tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) since the early 1950's. Initially developed for deployment to Europe to offset the Soviet/Warsaw Pact's huge conventional superiority and to deter war, these weapons have never been used in combat. With the demise of the Cold War, a desire to reduce nuclear weapon stockpiles, and the capability of sister services to employ TNW, if needed, the Army must decide whether it needs to retain its capability to employ TNW. Following a discussion of the evolution of TNW theory and a historical review of the Army's TNW capability, this monograph addresses whether or not the Army needs the capability to employ TNW in future war. The analysis suggests that the Army should relinquish its TNW capability because of a decreased threat from the Soviet Union, the availability of Air Force and Navy TNW to support a theater Commander-in-Chief (CINC), and to avoid redundant TNW capabilities in an era of fiscal constraints. Before the Army gives up its TNW capability, however, the Department of Defense must ensure that the Air Force and Navy can perform all TNW missions in support of a CINC.

ADA 240197 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)