This monograph is an assessment of the performance of the Iraqi Army in selected major operations from 1941 to 1988. Focused primarily at the operational level, this study first describes the Iraqi Army's performance in an abbreviated 1941 conflict with Britain. Next, there is an analysis of the role the Iraqis played in the Arab Israeli Wars of 1948/56/67 and 1973. The historical review of Iraqi operations ends with a more detailed account of the opening and closing campaigns of the Iran Iraq War. The operational performance of the Iraqis is measured against the six Operational Operating Systems (OOSs) described in Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 11-9, Blueprint of the Battlefield. Serving as the analytical criteria for this study, the OOSs include: operational movements and maneuvers, fires, protection, command and control, military intelligence, and support. Even though the Iraqis represent a formidable military challenge to the United States, this study finds that historically, with the final campaign of the Gulf War being the single exception, the overall operational performance of the Iraqi Army has been generally poor. The conclusions reached in this study also suggest that Iraqi operational weaknesses far outweigh their strengths, especially in the areas of maneuver, command and control, and protection. Finally this monograph closes with recommendations on how these operational vulnerabilities can be exploited by US Forces in the Persian Gulf in the event the current crisis leads to war with Iraq.

ADA 233510 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)