This monograph argues that tactical disruption is an operational concept which will lead to superior friendly combat power at the decisive point. This relative combat power is forged by the commander from the capabilities of his unit, and his employment of them. Commanders strive to maximize their own capabilities and combat power, while degrading those of the enemy commander. This monograph argues that tactical disruption is an operational concept which will lead to superior friendly combat power at the decisive point. The monograph first examines the military theorists and thinkers from which tactical disruption has grown, in order to understand the theoretical framework it operates within. The author argues that the opposing commander's decision cycle is the ultimate target of disruption operations. An historical example is used to demonstrate tactical disruption, and finally, U.S. Army doctrine is examined in order to determine the current role of tactical disruption. The monograph concludes that tactical disruption is embedded through out Airland Battle doctrine. However, tactical disruption is not a formal strategy, and there is no coordinated disruption effort at the tactical level. The monograph closes with recommendations to adopt tactical disruption as a formal doctrinal concept.

ADA 233105 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)