The last several years have brought stunning changes in the world's economic, political, and social fabric. The demise of the Warsaw Pact, reduced Soviet threat, and easing of Cold War tensions have changed the strategic environment. The post-Cold War army will be smaller, CONUS based, and used in a power projection role. As the Army "builds down" and restructures itself, the organization of the "contingency army" is being debated. This monograph examines one aspect of the debate; Should heavy forces be included in the contingency army? This monograph begins by defining contingencies and the role they play in supporting national strategy and policies. A brief history of U.S. contingency operations and the reasons they are conducted is presented. The background is completed by developing the primary characteristics of contingency operations, and a discussion of what constitutes a credible contingency force. The proposed contingency army is examined through the lens of versatility, lethality, and deployability to determine the need for heavy forces. The British Army experience in the Boer War, and the American Army's experience in the Korean War are used as historical examples. The monograph concludes that the contingency army must include heavy forces to be credible. In order to conduct a wide range of missions, against all threats, and across the spectrum of conflict, the contingency army needs access to all the capabilities in the Army. To be lethal the contingency army needs heavy forces with their inherent characteristics of mobility, firepower, and survivability. To be truly deployable, these required heavy forces must be an integral part of the contingency army.

ADA 240302 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)