The mission of the United States Air Force is to fly, fight, and win. This monograph seeks to determine what is the best means of motivating airmen under fire, minimize the effects of combat stress, and avert unit disintegration. This journey begins with a brief review of classical theory on combat motivation and then transitions to the more contemporary assertions of Anthony Kellett. From Kellett's analysis, four elements are drawn together to form the basis and criteria by which commanders and aircrews alike can gauge their preparedness for dealing with the stress, fear, and anxieties of combat. With a theoretical basis and model established, this monograph proceeds with an examination of the 1972 Linebacker II campaign against North Vietnam. This examination begins with an overview of B-52 Arc Light operations and then focuses upon a chronological analysis of Linebacker II with the intent of gaining a historical perspective into the inherent problems of motivating aircrews in combat. Following some analysis into the influence of aircrew morale, cohesion, training, and leadership during this campaign, this project concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of these four elements upon today's and tomorrow's aerial battlefield. In closing, this monograph suggests that perhaps now is the ideal time to shift our attention away from the "machine" and focus upon the "man" and the elements that influence his will to fight.

ADA 240211 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)