This monograph conducts an analysis of historical data to detect trends in war and the evolution to modern tactical battle. It also investigates the continued use of Lanchester-based attrition models. Military analysts have used the attrition models of Lanchester in an attempt to capture the dynamics of modern battle to answer questions for tactical and strategic decision makers. These questions involve technical evaluations of weapon systems, force structure, doctrinal issues, and training. The methodology uses historical data of 1080 tactical land battles compiled in a study of battles from the years 1618-1905. The data was partitioned into two sets, pre- and post-American Civil War, to test the hypothesis that the conduct of warfare changes around 1865. The evaluation used a generalized form of Lanchester's equations in the form of a linear regression model to indicate which Lanchester-based attrition model best represented the data. A standard statistical hypothesis test called the Student "t" test was applied to determine if the population parameters of the data sets were statistically different and indicated a charge in the conduct of battle. The quantitative analysis revealed that Lanchester's Linear and Square Laws do not adequately describe the battles of this study. This implies that attrition process and battle conditions postulated by these laws are not supported. Peterson's Logarithmic Law is more representative of the data and implies that the casualty producing power of a force increases as the force size decreases. The evolution of modern battle is marked by quantitative difference as measured by the casualty to initial force ratio. There is a trend toward decreasing ratios that coincides with the post-American Civil War period. The five technological innovations of the nineteenth century: rifled muskets, breechloaders, magazines, barbed wire, and smokeless powder were the catalysts of change in the tactical conduct of warfare. The lethality of the new weapons with their increased accuracy and range combined with the substantial increase in rates of fire forced the change in battlefield tactics.

ADA 233235 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)