During Operation DESERT STORM, Third U.S. Army was tasked to perform the roles of Army component command for U. S. Central Command (CENTCOM), theater army for all U. S. Army forces in the Persian Gulf theater, and field army headquarters for multicorps operations. The question that faced the commander-in-chief (CINC) and the Army component commander was how to organize the Army chain of command to fulfill these requirements. This monograph seeks to answer one aspect of the problem: to determine whether or not the Army component commander should establish a field army headquarters in a theater of operations. The study begins with an examination of organization theory. This examination suggests that as an organization moves through its life cycle, its chain of command structure changes as the organization grows. Next, the monograph focuses on an analysis of history to determine trends in theater command and control (C2) and whether the use of a field army was feasible, acceptable, and suitable based on the conditions found in World War II and the Korean War. The monograph then reviews current doctrine to determine the status of Army doctrine for C2 at echelons above corps (EAC). Finally, the study analyzes Third Army's experiences from Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM to determine the considerations used to establish the C2 structure in that conflict. The study concludes that the decision to use a field army and if so, when, is guided by a series of factors: nature of the conflict, nature of the theater, personality of commanders, ability and experience of senior leaders, and span of responsibility. Furthermore, principles such as unity of command and simplicity and factors such as mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time (METT-T) provide proven readily available considerations the CINC and Army component commander can use to determine whether or not a field army should be established in a theater of operations.

ADA 254060 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)