This monograph determines the prospects for peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula and the implications of unification on United States' military strategy in Northeast Asia. The prospects for Korean unification are analyzed in the context of a Unification Model based on the German unification experience. The degree to which Korean specific historic/cultural, political and economic factors fit the Unification Model determine the prospects for peaceful unification of the peninsula and provide insights into the path and pace that Korean unification might take. The implications of Korean unification on United States military strategy in Northeast Asia are determined by reviewing present day United States regional strategy and Korea's role in that strategy. United States military strategic options in a post-Korean unification environment are reviewed and a recommended military strategy is proposed to support United States national strategic interests in the region. Two conclusions are presented. First, the peaceful unification of Korea is likely to occur within the next five to ten years and secondly, the United States should retain a forward military presence in Northeast Asia after Korean unification. Analysis of the Unification Model indicates that deteriorating economic conditions in North Korea are likely to force the North Korean government to become more conciliatory toward social, political and economic overtures made by South Korea. The conclusion that the United States should keep armed forces forward deployed in Northeast Asia is attained through analysis of the historic and present day geopolitical relationships that exist among the powers in Northeast Asia. Factors that influence this conclusion include the economic interest that the United States has in a stable Northeast Asia and the distrust with which other Northeast Asians view the Japanese.

ADA 254061 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)