This monograph explores the reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance requirements needed to conduct the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process effectively in a light infantry brigade. It considers current and past reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance capabilities of the light infantry brigade and battalion. It also examines how these operations fit into the IPB process. One constant weakness identified in units attending the Combat Training Centers has been the planning and execution of reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance. Many of the weaknesses have been attributed to the inability of staffs and commanders to integrate recon and counterrecon into their planning process. Similarly, many staff weaknesses can be directly attributed to failures in recon or counterrecon. As the Army transitions from AirLand Battle to AirLand Operations, recon and counterrecon will play an even greater role in warfighting. This paper explores the synergistic effect that these operations and the IPB process have on one another and how to reduce the friction that currently exists between them. Considering historical observations, current capabilities, and future needs, this study focuses on the intelligence gathering requirements of the light infantry brigade. It presents training, doctrine, equipment, structure and leadership changes needed to improve brigade capabilities to conduct recon and counterrecon today and in the future. The recommendations presented in this monograph will lead to an infantry brigade that is ready to fight and trained to win.

ADA 249852 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)