American military doctrine and professional literature in the past decade have stressed maneuver warfare and the operational level of war. This monograph traces the evolution of maneuver theory and its conceptual opposite, firepower theory, and concludes that, reflecting the tensions in war's "dual natures," both methods have advantages and disadvantages. Under certain circumstances, the systematic method of firepower warfare is superior to maneuver theory; in many situations, a blend of the two approaches is preferable. Many current conceptions of maneuver warfare, however, are too broad and all-encompassing to offer much specificity. This monograph also contends that the operational level, at which military forces are used to pursue strategic objectives, is not synonymous with operational art. Instead, the operational level may be fought by either of two ideal methods or, most likely, by a blend of the two approaches. The first, "operational art," is the maneuver warfare style elevated to the operational level, and attacks critical enemy weaknesses via unexpected means to achieve moral disruption of the enemy. Operational art stresses decentralized initiative, improvisation, and distributed maneuver. The second, complementary method is "operational science," which is firepower warfare practiced at the operational level. Operational science orients on the enemy's strength and emphasizes detailed planning, destruction by fires, centralized battlefield grip, and concentration. The monograph summarizes the analysis with a typology reflecting the salient characteristics of operational art and operational science.

ADA 254156 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)