This monograph investigates the viability of the requirement for the retention and maintenance of operational-level reserves, given the emergent U.S. Army doctrinal concept of AirLand Operations. Additionally, with the rapid mobility and precision lethality with which our forces are capable of operating on the modern battlefield, as most recently demonstrated in the Persian Gulf War, the monograph addresses the issue of whether an operational commander needs to maintain a reserve force as a hedge against uncertainty. The monograph first examines theoretical and current doctrinal literature regarding the use of operational reserves. Next, Napoleon's 1805 campaign which culminated in the battle of Austerlitz shows the classical, traditional use of operational reserves in which these forces were initially held back from the action to be committed at the decisive moment and place on the battlefield. Following this, the U.S. Army's operations in the Ardennes in the Battle of the Bulge demonstrate how a reliance on superior mobility and firepower to react to unforseen threats from less threatened areas of the theater can compensate for a lack of operational reserves. The last historical analysis is of the Soviet Union's 1945 Manchurian campaign against the Japanese in which certain preconditions were fulfilled before the campaign began, thereby alleviating the requirement for use of operational reserves. The monograph concludes that by establishing through proper analysis and assessment the right preconditions before operations, and by relying on superior mobility and enhanced lethality, the U.S. Army in a joint environment can execute successful operational maneuver without maintaining operational reserves. This allows the simultaneous employment of all available combat power against the enemy, resulting in the commitment of overwhelming force at the decisive time and place. Regarding current doctrinal definitions of operational reserves, more precision is needed. Operational reserves must be viewed differently from tactical reserves. As Clausewitz discussed, while the tactical commander designates a reserve to prolong his battle and react to unanticipated enemy actions, and thereby commits his forces sequentially, the operational commander must strive for the simultaneous commitment of overwhelming force. This will preclude the creation of tactical liabilities as a result of withholding forces in operational reserve. Finally, operational artists must be willing to rely on generating operational reserves from less threatened areas, accepting prudent risks, and ensuring that battles and engagements are properly resourced and planned to create the tactical successes that produce operational success. By reducing uncertainty to an absolute minimum, commanders must be able to correctly anticipate the flow of the campaign to ensure the maximum concentration of decisive combat capability.

ADA 252040 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)