This monograph examines the capability of contemporary operational planners to successfully plan and execute a large scale forcible entry operation in response to a major regional contingency. The relationship of a forcible entry in achieving a campaign's or major operation's objectives is examined in light of the finite forcible entry capability found in current force structures and transportation assets. The monograph uses the Operational Operating Systems outlined in TRADOC Pam 11-9, Blueprint of the Battlefield, to examine the historical forcible entry operations conducted at Crete and Inchon. From this analysis a theoretical framework for forcible entry operations is developed and compared to current U.S. forcible entry capabilities. The monograph concludes that a successful large scale forcible entry will be a function of an operational planner's ability to capitalize on the complementary capabilities of all available forces and operating systems. Combat power in a contingency region is found to be a function of the successful orchestration of all of the Operational Operating Systems. Shortages in one system may offset by increasing the strength of another system.

ADA 255309 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)