The goal of this monograph is to determine if the use of air assault forces to counter armored penetrations on the modern battlefield is a viable option for the U.S. Army. The paper examines the problem of defeating penetrations; the theoretical and historical bases for using air assault forces against armored forces; and the capabilities and limitations of air assault forces in the counterpenetration role. The paper then moves to the employment of an air assault counterpenetration force, with emphasis on the defender's decision cycle and how the defender mist decide how to commit such a force. Finally, U.S. force structures are examined to determine if U.S. forces as currently organized can execute air assault counterpenetration operations. The author concludes that air assault forces can be effective against armored penetrations. In the U.S. Army, only the air assault division can perform such a mission, while the light and airborne divisions are capable of air assault counterpenetration operations only if given proper augmentation.

ADA 258104 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)