This monograph discusses the air assault division's ability to be employed in the same manner as a Soviet style tank division Operational Maneuver Group (OMG). Since the 1930's, Soviet Army doctrine for operational level warfighting has steadily evolved. Lessons learned from Tukhachevsky and other early 20th Century theorists led to a doctrine designed to counter NATO, and culminated with the introduction of the OMG in 1980. The OMG is a tactical organization designed to secure operational objectives that support strategic goals. This monograph seeks to answer whether or not the U.S. Army can employ the air assault division in the same manner? Given the smaller size of future mechanized and armor forces, the air assault division may be the only type of unit in the Army that can conduct decisive operational maneuver. The monograph begins with an overview of the evaluation criteria; the Operational Operating Systems (OOSs) described in Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 11-9, "Blueprint of the Battlefield." The OOSs include: operational movement and maneuver, fires, protection, command and control, intelligence, and support. Next, the OMG is traced throughout its origin in Soviet doctrine with emphasis on its application in operational maneuver. Then, the U.S. Army's air assault division's evolution, capabilities, and limitations are analyzed with its role as an operational level maneuver force serving as the focal point. Finally, the OMG and air assault division are compared to the OOSs to assess each organization's ability to conduct operational level missions. The result of the analysis was a determination that the air assault division will require significant augmentation in operational fires, protection, and intelligence to be successfully employed in the same manner as the OMG. Most importantly, the air assault division will require operational commanders who know how to maximize the division's strengths, minimize its weaknesses, and integrate the division into the campaign plan.

ADA 253441 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)