Transition points occur in many activities; they are pivotal junctions in the determination of the future course of events. Identification of such points is crucial if a commander is to make effective and efficient use of the military resources that his nation makes available to him. In particular, during armed conflict, the identification of victor or loser can be as simple as determining which force failed to identify and adjust to the changing characteristics of war. The purpose of this monograph is to examine transition through a filter of six factors and determine whether or not we are presently undergoing a change in the nature of war. Specifically, the research question of this monograph is as follows: Do recent developments in technology, intelligence gathering capability, weapons systems, command and control architecture, the military aspects of space and time, and the relationship among the elements of the Clausewitzian trinity suggest that the military strategy of the classic decisive battle is returning? To answer this question I use these six factors to examine three historical examples: Napoleon's battle at Austerlitz, Grant's 1865 campaign, and the Gulf War. Three theories provide a foundation for analysis. Carl von Clausewitz's nature of classical war, presented in "On War," provides the basis for the characteristics of the decisive battle. Two operational level warfare theories, presented in James J. Schneider's "Vulcan's Anvil" and LTC (P) James M. Dubik's "Grant's Campaign" provide a view of the characteristics of the operational level of war. Analysis of these theoretical concepts permit a possible projection as to the future direction in the nature of war. This monograph concludes with the determination that operational practitioners may have yet another tool with which to conduct warfare, the decisive campaign. This decisive campaign, however, is unlike that of Grant's, for it achieves victory through the use of simultaneity in depth of theater without protracted war.

ADA 254122 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)