This monograph analyzes whether the heavy corps should fight the light infantry division (LID) as a pure force in a mid-high intensity conflict (M/HIC). The monograph examines current doctrine from FM 100-5 down to division-level manuals. While doctrine states that the level of task organization is dependent on METT-T and the commander's estimate process, light infantry field manuals and field circulars fail to adequately address heavy/light operations. Next, two historical examples of infantry fighting in a M/HIC demonstrate the viability of fighting a pure LID in a heavy corps. The first example studies the German invasion of Crete, where the 5th Mountain Infantry Division fought as a pure force under the 11th Airborne Corps against a heavy/light Allied force. The second example reviews Egypt's use of dismounted infantry in its initial assault across the Suez Canal during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Finally, the monograph analyzes the mobility, firepower, and survivability of heavy and light divisions within a heavy corps by comparing divisions fought as pure organizations with those task organized for heavy/light operations. The monograph's conclusion confirms the doctrinal guidance that task organization decisions are a function of the commander's estimate process. However, evidence does support fighting the LID pure in some situations. This conclusion implies a need to: fill the doctrinal void in the light division field manuals and field circulars; increase the LID'S transportation capabilities; and improve its artillery, antitank, antiaircraft weapons.

ADA 258311 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)