This monograph analyzes the concept of decisive terrain to determine if a commander can identify decisive terrain at the operational level of war. The monograph begins by examining the introduction of decisive terrain into doctrine and provides a more comprehensive definition based on several theorists and research. Next an analysis is made of how the United States Army's current publications address decisive terrain. The documents reviewed include FM 100-5, FM 34-3, FM 101-5-1, FM 34-130, and ST 100-9. The purpose of the next section is to examine how the Russians, British, Germans, and Chinese armies study key terrain. Two case studies, the Gettysburg Campaign and the Austerlitz Campaign, provide examples of commanders who successfully and unsuccessfully identified decisive terrain. The commanders who failed to recognize decisive terrain at the operational level of war suffered massive casualties that had a significant impact on the future of their armies. The monograph concludes with a section on the importance of decisive terrain and recommendations on how better to define decisive terrain and increase the awareness of decisive terrain in our literature and military schooling. Decisive terrain can be identified at the operational level of war. However, the identification of decisive terrain by a commander or recommendations by the staff demands determining if an area has a combination of geographical advantages, affords a marked advantage, becomes so critical that its loss would mean destruction to the defender, and requires the commander to have experience in analyzing terrain. Failure to identify decisive terrain can lead to defeat on the next battlefield.

ADA 274441 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)