With the approval of the Army's preliminary draft of its keystone doctrinal manual, FM 100-5, Operations, the terms quick, decisive victory is now an integral part of doctrinal lexicon. The introduction of this important phrase indicates the Army's principle focus in the prosecution of future military operations. This paper examines the historical concept of a decisive battle and relates it to the notion of a decisive campaign that produces decisive victory. This study addresses the question: Is quick, decisive victory a useful maxim for the Army or an illusory concept that reflects political exigencies rather than military realities? To provide a basis for analysis, this monograph is organized in the following three major sections. The first section provides a nineteenth century backdrop to the evolution of the concept of decisive victory. It examines the preeminent decisive battle of the Napoleonic era, Austerlitz, and the related theories of Carl Von Clausewitz and Hans Delbruk. The second section traces the American military's search for decisive victory in the following four conflicts: the Civil War, World War II, Vietnam, and the Gulf War. The third section examines the contemporary basis for the inclusion of decisive victory in the Army's keystone doctrinal manual FM 100-5, Operations. A discussion of the Weinberger Doctrine provides a critical link from the Vietnam experience to present day doctrine. A development of the concept of conflict termination helps define the parameters of winning and ultimate victory. Finally, this paper examines current US doctrine concerning decisive victory and concludes the following two points: First. The end of open conflict becomes the conduit for the use of other elements of national power. More appropriately, it can be said that there can only be a decisive ""military"" victory. Second, the doctrinal treatment of the principle of perseverance in FM 100-5 most accurately couches decisive victory within the vague parameters of political exigencies. Decisive victory can fall outside the responsibility of military intervention and the Army's doctrine must allow for this. Likewise, the military may well find itself involved in a crisis that requires the application of military force with the full realization that a quick military solution is not possible.

ADA 274409 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)