This monograph examines the possible roles of air power in peacemaking operations. While the end of the Cold War has brought increased hope for peace and stability in the world, a rise in ethnic tensions and nationalist uprisings prevents attainment of this goal. The crisis in Yugoslavia has provoked calls for armed intervention, yet in the U.S. opinions diverge over what type and amount of force would be necessary to compel an end to the fighting. While the Pentagon envisions the requirement for joint air and ground forces, other officials advocate a limited approach using air strikes to coerce the belligerent factions to lay down their arms. This study seeks to define the appropriate role for air power in peacemaking. The first section explains the purpose of peacemaking operations, contrasting them to peacekeeping operations to emphasize the different requirements for force in each. The next section expands on this distinction by developing guidelines for employing force to compel peace. The third section compares the inherent capabilities and limitations of air power with the unique requirements for force in peacemaking. This combination provides reasonable expectations for what air power can achieve in peacemaking situations. Historical examples demonstrate that air power has the potential to compel changes in belligerent behavior, but only under limited circumstances. The monograph concludes that since these favorable circumstances are not present in Yugoslavia, successful peacemaking there will likely require more than just limited air strikes.

ADA 262711 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)