The monograph's purpose is to explore the importance of the endstate, its degree of clarity and its effect on protecting national interests. It also investigates the importance the endstate serves in reducing friction within military forces. It primarily focuses on the development of strategic and operational objectives as well as the impact these objectives have on the design of task forces to achieve those objectives. The paper first defines conflict and its characteristics as they relate to defining the endstate. The differences between conflict resolution and conflict termination are explored. The paper also explores the conditions that affect the degree of intensity and the duration of conflicts based on whether the conflict is more rational or emotional in its character. The paper then discusses the interrelationship between the principles of war, tenets of operations and other concepts that military leaders have traditionally used to develop campaign plans. The discussion demonstrates the key concept governing the interrelationships is the first principle - objective. Organizational theory is then introduced to enhance the discussion of the importance the endstate plays in the psychology of organizations. The discussion focuses on the importance of developing operative goals that guide the design of organizational structures and which motivate and sustain group and individual behavior within the organization. Two campaigns -- OPERATION BARBAROSSA and OPERATION DESERT STORM -- are analyzed for illustrative purposes to show the effect the endstate played in the planning, organization and conduct of these campaigns. OPERATION BARBAROSSA, the German invasion of the USSR in 1941, serves as an example of a vague endstate; one in which the government and the military fail to achieve consensus. In the dynamics of human interaction, the ultimate purpose of the campaign becomes confused and the German offensive culminates before victory is achieved. OPERATION DESERT STORM, the United States-led coalition in the Persian Gulf in 1991, serves as an example of a clearly stated endstate and its effect on the planning, organization for and the execution of a campaign.

ADA 274438 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)