As the US Army's only significant ground combat force deployed in Korea, the Second Infantry Division merits special attention. The Division is positioned north of Seoul astride the main invasion mute from North Korea into South Korea and there is no corps-level US Army headquarters currently deployed in Korea. Accordingly, the Division may be committed to battle early in a future Korean war and this commitment may be under the operational control of a Republic of Korea Army Corps. This paper proposes that the Second Infantry Division is a strategic asset of the Combined Forces Command in Korea and that its commitment to battle with a Korean corps is a political--not a military--decision with profound implications for the United States. It further proposes that once committed to battle, the Division's success in combat is critical to the US-ROK alliance and that Combined Forces Command should resource the Division to enhance its probability of success. The paper examines the Northeast Asia security environment, the US-ROK security relationship and the Second Infantry Division's contribution to that relationship, analyzes coalition warfare and combined operations from a historic and doctrinal perspective, identifies leadership, capabilities and doctrinal differences between the US and ROK armies and concludes with tactical recommendations for Combined Forces Command to apply to the Second Infantry Division in a US-ROK combined operation.

ADA 274408 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)