This monograph examines the cumulative effect which improvements in information technology have had at the operational level of war. Specifically, it uses the Clausewitzian theory of war to analyze how modern methods of information processing and communication increase the influence of national policy in military operations. The monograph is introduced with a brief survey of the ways in which both the international political economy and military operations have changed as a result of the Third Industrial Revolution of high technology. It goes on to show that innovations in military and information technology have dramatically changed the manifestations of modern war. The question of whether the doctrine of extremes is flexible enough to accommodate these changes in information technology is then posed. A thorough review of the trinity of war follows the introduction and establishes the theoretical foundation for the argument. A brief examination of the convergence of weapons and information technology shows that war has adapted to the dominant features of the Information Age, creating a technological trinity of post-industrial warfare. Chaos theory is then introduced as a means to provide insight into the transformed manifestations of modern war. From this baseline the monograph analyzes the practical application of Clausewitz's theoretical construct at the tactical, strategic, and operational levels of war. An in-depth case study from Desert Storm demonstrates that the cumulative effect of improvements in information technology yields precise command direction by national policymakers in military operations. The resultant product of these technological interactions is a new type of unexpected friction at the operational level of war. Finally, the monograph focuses on the implications of precise command direction for operational warfare in the future. It ends on a cautionary note, suggesting that while theory is flexible enough to incorporate these developments our warfighting doctrine and force structure must also keep pace.

ADA 274442 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)