This monograph discusses, from an airman's perspective, the expression of American operational art called parallel war. Parallel war is defined as the simultaneous and near continuous attack against strategic, operational, and tactical targets. The author explores whether or not parallel war has become the ideal expression of American operational art (i.e., is it the best way to achieve quick, decisive victory with minimum friendly casualties?). Two campaigns are examined. MacArthur's serial campaign (sequential, step-by-step approach) against the Japanese in the South West Pacific is the first. It is contrasted with Schwarzkopf's parallel war against Iraq during Desert Storm. Consistent trends between the two styles are highlighted while the unique features of parallel war are discussed. The monograph concludes that parallel war is significantly different from serial war. The maturation of American airpower gives commanders unprecedented ways and means to influence the course of events and the enemy decision makers. The United States now can, through parallel war, quickly shatter an enemy's strategic and operational ability to resist. Its employment depends on recognizing when it can be used - a skill which comes from understanding both the situation and the tools available.

ADA 274440 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)