This monograph analyzes U.S. Army doctrine for combat service support at echelons above corps. Army concepts for supporting operations involving multiple corps were called into question by actions taken during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. During these operations, an ad hoc, non-doctrinal organization provided support to the U.S. forces deployed to the theater. This occurred despite the fact that organizations existed to provide the support in accordance with published doctrine. Current doctrine is first summarized to illustrate how the Army envisioned supporting a multi-corps contingency operation. Doctrine examined includes that of Army theater command and control architecture, as decisions on the role of the Field Army and Theater Army are key to the design of the theater support structure. Support operations during Desert Shield and Desert Storm are then detailed, and the contrasts with the doctrine are illustrated. Emerging concepts for support at echelons above corps are then discussed, with an emphasis on the lessons learned from the experience in the desert. Key among these are closer integration of wholesale support activities into contingency operations, and ways to improve the integration of reserve component logistics units into contingency plans. The monograph concludes that existing doctrine for Army operations at echelons above corps requires revision for both command and control at theater level, and also for theater support operations. Emerging doctrine, currently still in draft, appears to be on the right track, as it supports concepts for force projection identified in the Army's emerging operational doctrine, FM 100-5. The key challenge for the Army in the near future will be for it to find a way to exercise its force projection doctrine, as both locations and dollars for large deployment exercises may well be lacking.

ADA 274543 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)