This monograph identifies and examines the criterion for the acceptance of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as tactical joint force multipliers. The concept for their use rests on historical validation as well as the realization that force multipliers with joint applicability appropriately reflect new political and fiscal realities. Current and near term UAV technology offers some very needed capabilities to aid success on the future tactical field of battle. The monograph investigates the historical use of UAVs, specifically concentrating on Israeli use in the 1982 Lebanon Air War and United States use during operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Historical examples serve to demonstrate UAV capability across five broad mission areas: reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition; targeting; deception; electronic warfare; and command and control. Finally, the monograph discusses the current status and projected future of UAVs. Discussion in this area surrounds the recently created UAV Joint Program Office, cost-effectiveness of UAVs, and institutional inertia. Research shows that it would pay the United States to invest in the flexibility of UAVs. They are proven in combat, cost-effective, adaptable to future technology, and are a logical choice to multiply combat force m the future battlefield. Overcoming organizational resistance, not technology, is the major barrier to UAV acceptance.

ADA 262663 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)