This monograph examines whether the air defense artillery battalion organic to armored or mechanized divisions is necessary for operations on future battlefields. To explore relevant issues in this area, historical examples from World War I, the Falkland Islands Conflict, the Afghanistan War, and the Israeli invasion into Lebanon in 1982 are cited as lessons learned. An examination of the air defense Battlefield Operation System functions as specified in TRADOC pamphlet 11-9 then serves as a baseline for comparison against currently fielded air defense weapon systems and their ability to accomplish the mission assigned them. The study determines that American mechanized and armored divisions are vulnerable to engagement from modern attack helicopters. Additionally, divisions are vulnerable to detection from enemy unmanned aerial vehicles and remotely piloted vehicles, which can relay friendly unit locations to threat target engagement systems. The division air defense battalion is severely limited in its ability to engage these weapon and information systems at their maximum effective ranges. A materiel solution to the problem is required. The study concludes that the Army must continue to develop and field a complementary system of divisional air defense artillery weapons which can engage rotary wing targets, low observable targets (UAV/RPV), as well as fixed wing close air support aircraft. In our weapons acquisition process, we must not favor the offense to the exclusion of the defense. We must continue to advance our technological edge in order to defeat a variety of threat aircraft that could interfere with our ability to defend our national interests.

ADA 264505 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)