This monograph examines several definitions for the operational fires concept, and traces the theoretical underpinnings of operational fires from both Russian operational theory and airpower theories. The monograph then examines historical examples of the decisive use of operational fires. The examples are from 1960 to the present, and include Khe Sanh and Operation Thor in Vietnam, 1968, Operation Linebacker II in Vietnam, 1972, the Yom Kippur War in the Middle East, 1973, and Operation El Dorado Canyon over Libya, 1986. An examination of United States Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force, and Joint doctrine on operational fires then provides the basis for analyzing the conditions under which operational fires are likely to have decisive impact on a campaign or major operation. These conditions are: 1. Detailed Pre-execution Planning 2. Aggressive Intelligence/Damage Assessment 3. Overlapping Tactical, Operational, and Strategic Goals 4. Limited Critical Infrastructure/Material 5. Complementary Capabilities 6. Synchronization 7. Centralized Control/Decentralized Execution. The analysis examines how each of these conditions may contribute to the decisive use of operational fires.

ADA 274103 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)