This monograph examines if the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) should delineate area responsibilities to air and ground commanders. During Operation Desert Storm the Joint Force Commander (JFC) made the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) responsible for the area beyond the FSCL. This facilitated the execution of the theater interdiction effort but forced ground commanders to coordinate with the JFACC before engaging targets beyond the FSCL. This use of the FSCL differed from joint and army doctrine, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Combined Forces Command (CFC) practice. This monograph begins by describing the evolution of the FSCL, giving its current definition, and examining how it was used during Operation Desert Storm and is used by NATO and the CFC. The monograph then uses John Warden's key force concept and Martin Van Creveld's theory about command to develop criteria for analyzing alternative answers to the research question. After analyzing alternatives, the monograph recommends a system and describes its implications for joint commanders. The monograph recommends a more flexible system for delineating area responsibilities to air and ground commanders. This system allows the JFC to balance the needs of both the JFACC and the ground commanders for unity of effort based on the situation. It uses boundaries, allows the JFC and ground commanders to establish permissive areas for the JFACC, makes the JFC and ground commanders responsible for establishing the target priorities in these permissive areas, and refines the Air Force's force application missions to make them more responsive to ground commanders if this is required. This flexible system allows the JFC to delineate area responsibilities in a variety of ways and strengthens the link between ground and air by forcing them to train together in many different situations.

ADA 274102 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)