The purpose of this monograph is to examine the adequacy of the current national military command and control structure, analyze examples of various European general staffs, and determine whether a general staff system would best suit America's future military requirements. The monograph first examines the history of the European General Staff systems with an emphasis on the Prussian-German General Staff. The monograph then examines the effectiveness of these staffs, again with emphasis on the Prussian-German model, in the preparation for and the conduct of war. The monograph analyzes the current American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and examines the contemporary shortcomings that led to periodic revisions. The monograph determines that the Prussian-German system did a superlative job of preparing its officers for war, and when military interests were properly subordinated to political concerns, this system performed as designed. The monograph concludes that the current American JCS system still has significant problems that incremental Congressional revision has not corrected. The monograph further determines that a General Staff system, patterned on that of the Germans, would alleviate much of the problem. Despite evidence to the contrary, however, Congress and the American people continue to view a general staff system as a significant potential threat to America's democratic ideals. The monograph recommends that, given continued Congressional and public opposition to a General Staff, fundamental changes be made to the current JCS system. Specific recommendations include eliminating the Joint Chiefs of Staff, creation of a permanent body of joint specialty officers to form the Joint Staff and serve on the unified and specified commands, and redesignating the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the, Director of the Joint Staff.

ADA 274042 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)