This monograph describes the history of the planning and execution of Operation JUST CAUSE. It focuses on the operation's relationship to the theory and doctrine of operational art to answer the question: Was Operation JUST CAUSE an application of operational art? This monograph first summarizes U.S. Army doctrine and selected theoretical works on operational art. Next, to understand the strategic and operational setting within which the military created plans, the paper provides an overview of the crisis in Panama. It emphasizes pre-JUST CAUSE political and military actions, and associated military planning efforts, followed by a summary of operational results. The paper then compares Operation JUST CAUSE planning and execution to doctrine and theory to determine if military planners applied operational art. This monograph concludes that Operation JUST CAUSE was an excellent application of operational art. Its planners apparently understood existing doctrine and used the art to develop a highly effective operational plan that attained the desired strategic goals. The planners received the visionary guidance of three gifted officers, General Thurman, LTG Stiner, and LTG Foss. These officers also benefited from having leaders in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Bush Administration who gave them their head and did not tinker with their plan. The result was a stunning American victory accomplished in short order with minimum casualties.

ADA 274367 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)