The monograph evaluates the viability of quick decisive victory as a principle of U.S. military strategy. Modern concepts of quick decisive victory form the cornerstone of present U.S. military strategy. These concepts originated from the Weinberger Doctrine, but the principle of decisive force in the 1992 National Military Strategy Document, now establishes the framework for quick decisive victory. Today the U.S. military is using quick decisive victory to provide a clear focus while moving from a grand strategy based on a Cold War global context to a grand strategy based on a Post-Cold War regional context. Although the idea of quick decisive victory has strong support within the military services some political-military analysts claim it too narrowly defines the limits of U.S. military power in a mono-polar strategic environment. Therefore, this monograph examines the suitability of quick decisive victory as a defining element of U.S. military strategy. To accomplish this examination, the monograph first conducts a historical analysis of two decisive victories: the Ulm-Austerlitz campaign of 1805; and the 1940 campaign for France. This analysis identifies the strategic and operational conditions supporting quick decisive victory. Secondly, the monograph assesses the present strategic environment and compares present conditions with the historical analysis. Finally, the monograph evaluates the comparative assessment to determine possible benefits and risks for codifying quick decisive victory in U.S. military strategy. The monograph concludes that the concepts of quick decisive victory should remain part of U.S. military strategy. However, U.S. military strategy must also integrate ideas for employment of limited military force in operations other than war, and for employment of military force during protracted conflicts. Incorporating these concepts will produce a balanced and viable military strategy.

ADA 274047 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)