This study seeks to determine whether current tactics, techniques, and procedures for a heavy battalion task force conducting offensive operations in mountainous terrain are adequate. Many potential crisis spots where U.S. forces could deploy are in mountainous regions. Most potential enemy forces in mountainous areas have a significant armor capability. The study first defines the environment of mountain warfare and its relevance to a power projection force, such as the U.S. Army. Next, the theoretical foundations of offensive mountain warfare are applied by examining the theories of Jomini and Clausewitz. Then the study examines three historical examples: German armor in the Balkans (1941), U.S. armor operations in Italy (1944), and the use of Soviet armor in Afghanistan (1979-1988). Current tactics, techniques, and procedures for offensive operations in mountains are analyzed using historical observations and the elements of combat power from Field Manual 100-5, Operations. The study concludes that current tactics, techniques, and procedures for a heavy battalion task force conducting offensive operations in mountainous terrain are inadequate. Changes to current tactics, techniques, and procedures are recommended. Implications on training and the organization of a heavy battalion task force are discussed.

ADA 289161 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)