An examination of Joint Pub (JP) 5-00.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Campaign Planning, reveals two major disconnects. The publication asserts that the essence of operational art lies in protecting and maintaining the integrity of friendly centers of gravity while concentrating military resources against the enemy in a way that results in the JFC obtaining the strategic or operational advantage. However, the publication does not deal with the critical issue of how the joint force commander can identify centers of gravity. JP 5-00.1 also seeks to provide a methodology for translating theater strategy into an implemented campaign plan and to sequence and synchronize the employment of all available land, sea, air, special operations and space forces. Instead, it provides a description of several concepts without tying them together into a usable process. The result is JP 5-00.1 does not provide a comprehensive methodology for developing a campaign plan or synchronizing the use of the joint force's assets. This monograph corrects JP 5-00.1's deficiencies by providing a means to identify centers of gravity and a framework from which to synchronize the joint force's attack. Theory and doctrine are the basis from which to: examine Carl von Clausewitz's concept of center of gravity (COG); look at how each service approaches the attack of COGs; discuss the Mendel-Tooke and Warden models for identifying COGs; and to modify the tactical targeting process for use at the operational level. Combining the above with the traditional doctrinal concepts of operational design (lines of operation, decisive points, culmination, and arranging operations) yields the Decide-Detect-Attack methodology that both identifies centers of gravity and effectively and efficiency synchronize the joint force's attack. The monograph concludes by recommending the writers of joint doctrine include the Decide-Detect-Attack Methodology as a component of Joint Pub 5-00.1.

ADA 284242 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)