This monograph examines the ability of each service to support the joint suppression of enemy air defenses (J-SEAD). J-SEAD involves using all available forces, such as aircraft, artillery and electronic warfare, to effectively suppress enemy surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery. This requires a coherent plan and integration of responsibilities to ensure timely response and efficient application of assets. As such, each service must have a firm doctrinal base for the integration of forces. This monograph analyses the joint doctrine, as well as the doctrines of all four services, for their ability to effectively perform the J-SEAD mission. The monograph looks first at the history of J-SEAD from World War II through Desert Storm. Next, it examines the joint doctrine, noting service requirements and discussing several deficiencies. Then, the doctrines of each service are examined by focusing on the organization, planning, and execution of J-SEAD. Deficiencies in the service doctrines are also highlighted and needed changes are discussed. Two historical vignettes are provided; both cases display the potential of effective J-SFAD. The monograph concludes that the present organization for J-SEAD is effective, but several changes are needed to make it more efficient. Particular changes include the placement of electronic warfare jamming resources under the direct control of the fire support coordinator, a dedicated J-SEAD coordinator in the fire support element, and a greater emphasis in all doctrines on the ability of each service to contribute to J-SEAD.

ADA 288707 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)