This monograph discusses whether current U.S. Army doctrine for the use of light armor is sufficient to support light infantry forces in military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) at the brigade level. The U.S. Army will soon replace the M-551Al Sheridan with the M-8 light tank. The most likely employment of light armor will be with light infantry divisions in contingency operations. The best use of a light division is in restrictive or urbanized terrain. The current urban doctrinal paradigm for armor is that tanks will avoid built up areas. The result of this mind set over many years is that typically armor and light infantry do not train together for MOUT. As a combined arms force, armored and light infantry forces are unprepared for war in urban areas. This monograph evaluates the relevancy of current and emerging U.S. Army light armor MOUT doctrine. It also examines historical lessons learned from armor operations with light infantry in MOUT. It focuses on three areas: (1) the need for light armor to fight in urban areas, (2) the need for combined arms orientation in MOUT, and (3) the need for a common doctrine on how to fight in MOUT. This monograph first examines the relevancy of current and emerging light armor MOUT doctrine. Next, the study examines three historical examples of armor / light armor and light infantry in MOUT. The three battles are Hue (1968), Suez (1973), and Panama (1989). Analysis reveals that light armor can not avoid urban areas. Light infantry units need the heavy direct fire support provided by light armor to fight in built up areas. The lack of doctrinal emphasis on MOUT has led to separate branch training and little combined training at all in built up areas. Armor units in particular do not often train MOUT. There is little in doctrine that tells light armor and light infantry forces how to fight together. This monograph reaches four conclusions. First, light armor will have to fight in built up areas with light infantry. Second, there must be a doctrinal change to emphasize the importance of MOUT combined arms training. Third, there must be one MOUT doctrine for light armor and light infantry fighting together. Light armor and light infantry MOUT doctrine should be in the future FM 90-10 or in a combined manual. Lastly, future MOUT doctrine must focus on how light armor and light infantry fight together.

ADA 288951 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)