It is 1994 and the United States Army is in the process of preparing itself for the 21st century. As part of that preparation, the Army must determine how it will organize its combat forces for future war. The Army has had experience with reorganization in the past. An examination of these past experiences is relevant to current efforts at reorganization. The monograph begins with a historical examination of the triangular concept that was the foundation for the Army's reorganization and force design on the eve of World WAR II. Then the monograph examines the pentomic concept which developed during the early years of the Cold War and was the operational concept for the Army until 1961. The historical sketches provide a foundation for analysis using a three part methodology. The methodology considers the strategic requirements that shape the nation's needs for its army, the operational concept that determines how the Army will fight and the system processes that influence the size, shape and complexion of the force. The monograph continues with a discussion of Clausewitz' understanding of the nature of war in relation to the Army's view of military theory and doctrine. It concludes with an examination of the Army's current situation, identifying several problems the Army must carefully consider. First, strategic requirements that ought to help determine the shape of the force are, themselves, unclear. Second, the Army's definition and understanding of war, a central part of its operational concept, has become increasingly more complex. Third, the Army's force structure, the reality of the force, is a function of Congressional willingness to provide money for the Army's budget. Finally, this study of past experiences provides a framework from which force planners can approach the increasingly complex problem of future war and force design.

ADA 284634 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)