On 1 September, 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell announced the results of the Clinton Administration's Bottom-up Review (BUR), to determine America's future defense needs. This analysis of the BUR identifies discrepancies with the methodology and underlying assumptions of the BUR. These flaws, in turn, resulted in serious deficiencies in the results of this important work. The BUR's point of departure for an examination of future defense needs was the 1991 demise of the Soviet Union. However, rather than develop a comprehensive picture of the nature of war and peace in the 21st Century as a basis for force planning, the BUR assumes limited wars of the DESERT STORM variety are the model for future conflict. Contemporary scholars such as Samuel Huntington, John Keegan, and Alvin and Heidi Toffler disagree with this assumption. They point to a clash of civilizations in the next century and an increased potential for violent cultural conflict. Such conflicts tend to be protracted and costly, not limited. The BUR's assumption concerning peace fails the test of history as provided by Geoffrey Blainey's exhaustive study of the causes of war and peace since 1700. The BUR's assumptions are that the best guarantors of peace are a thriving web of free trading relationships and an international partnership of democratic nations. Free trade is more often a result of peace, rather than a cause of peace. Democracy may not be the optimal form of government for all nations. As Blainey comments, free trade and democracy may have caused more international war than peace. The quantitative analysis approach of the BUR does not adequately assess the numerous subjective factors that have lead to wars in the past. When we do analyze those factors using Blainey's seven point theoretical construct, we find that despite America's preeminent position as the world's only superpower, the strategy, force structure and budget of the BUR actually increase the potential for international miscalculation and war. The BUR has unquestionably furthered the crucial debate on America's future national security needs. The BUR has kept Congressional attention focused on national security issues at a time of multiple competing priorities. Nevertheless, the deficiencies in methodology, assumptions and results limit the utility of the BUR as a blueprint for our future national strategy and force structure. It is time to put the BUR aside and develop a more realistic set of assumptions and methodology with which to decide our future strategy and force structure.

ADA 284613 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)