This monograph compares the Polish and Russian actions in the Battles of Warsaw and their subsequent impact on the development of operational thought. Although the Battle of Warsaw was overshadowed by events of the events of the two World Wars, the Polish victory ensured the rebirth of Poland and prevented the spread of the Russian Revolution by force of arms. Its impact on the development of Soviet operational thought was clearly significant. Its dismissal by most western theorists, by contrast, represented a missed opportunity to develop a theory which went beyond purely tactical actions. The section following the introduction reviews the strategic and political setting prior to the battle. The third and fourth sections examine the Polish army under the command of Marshal Pilsudski and the Russian army under the command of General Tukhachevski. The fifth section highlights actions of the Battle of Warsaw. The last section draws comparisons between the actions of the two sides and assesses the implications for the evolution of thought on the operational level of war. This monograph concludes that insights from Battle of Warsaw played a significant role in shaping Soviet operational thought during the interwar years, Most notably in the writings of Svechin and Tukhachevski.

ADA 284723 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)