This monograph examines Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces. It assesses if Joint Pub 1 is still a sound capstone manual which provides a common perspective for the continuing development of joint and service doctrine. The American experience in war has increasingly demanded joint action. Since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, joint doctrine has gained a greater measure of importance. For example, when Joint Pub 1 was published in November, 1991, General Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, stated that ""joint warfare is team warfare."" Joint Pub 1 is essentially his philosophy on joint warfare. He had the manual written to define a ""common perspective"" for all warfighting services when it comes to joint warfighting and the doctrine that guides it. The monograph begins with an examination of the development of joint and service doctrine. Evidence includes an assessment of Joint Pub 1 and each warfighting service's ""capstone" manuals. Additionally, an examination of the theorists who have had the greatest influence on today's US military doctrine is provided. This examination demonstrates that Carl von Clausewitz, and his seminal work, On War, has had the greatest influence on the joint and service capstone manuals that exist today. Along with the theorists another key influence of Joint Pub 1 has been the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The overall impact of this legislation has been very positive. It has created an atmosphere for further "jointness" in many areas, specifically doctrine. The next section analyses Joint Pub 1 using the feasibility, acceptability, and suitability model as a framework. It addresses whether Joint Pub 1 still provides a correct vision for development of additional joint doctrine. It assesses if it still provides the necessary flexibility given today's constrained environment which the Armed Forces must operate within. Lastly, it looks at whether or not there is a willingness in the services to accept certain costs based on some very uncertain endstates. This monograph concludes that Joint Pub 1 represents General Colin Powell's philosophy. While this was a valid philosophy given the conditions that existed in 1991, it no longer represents the conditions we face in 1994 and beyond. The "Bottom Up Review," continued down-sizing, and an unknown threat, has changed the way we will need to prepare for future warfare. These conditions came into being after the publication of Joint Pub 1. Therefore, Joint Pub 1 should, as a minimum, be reassessed by the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili.

ADA 284135 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)