This monograph examines whether the 1993 edition of Operations, the keystone U.S. Army operational level doctrine, provides sufficient description of considerations planners use in determining the sequence of actions for operations. To be sufficient the doctrine should enable planners to develop an understanding of the relationship of means to ends. This is necessary since, according to doctrine, a plan addresses ends, ways, and means. The study begins by analyzing theoretical ideas related to operational sequencing. The monograph groups the ideas within the following four evaluative criteria: the unifying aim, correlation of mans to actions, strength versus vulnerability and momentum. A critical analysis of two offensive, conventional operations bridges the gap between theory and reality, and constitutes part two. The case studies included are: the Pusan Perimeter breakout during the Korean War in 1950, Operation Chromite; and the invasion of Panama in 1989, Operation Just Cause. The third section describes the implications for sequencing based on the theory and case study analysis. These implications highlight considerations planners need to account for when determining the sequencing structure. These implications focus on developing the relationship between ends to means. The monograph then examines U.S. Army operational doctrine. This analysis determines if in fact doctrine bridges the gap between theory and experience us providing a sufficient framework for the sequencing decision. The monograph concludes that the doctrine does sufficiently address the considerations. However, there are three areas which require adjustment in order to prevent obscuring the relationship between ends to means. First, a noticeable bias toward simultaneity exists within this manual. Second, the definition of synchronization does not account for the effect or purpose of an action. Finally, FM 100-5 distributes the considerations for sequencing actions throughout the manual. These three deficiencies serve to detract from the value of FM 100-5 as a guide to the conduct of major operations.

ADA 284087 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)