Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the necessity of conventional military forces to adequately prepare for stability and reconstruction operations (SRO) in the aftermath of major combat operations (MCO). In the case of Iraq, there existed a narrow window of opportunity, perhaps ninety days long, following the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime. The window of opportunity presented the United States (U.S.) and coalition forces the possibility to immediately seize upon the goodwill of the newly emancipated Iraqi people, their democratic euphoria, and a generally permissive environment to set the conditions for successful SRO. The ability to rapidly transition from MCO to SRO is of vital importance, as it affords a unique opportunity for an occupying force to destroy an insurgency in its most vulnerable stage, its infancy. Unfortunately, the U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq were unable to exploit their initial success in MCO and now battle a full-scale insurgency, the outcome of which remains very much undecided. U.S. Army operations in the latter half of the 20th Century and the outset of the current century have almost always necessitated the need for the ability of the U.S. armed forces to rapidly conduct the transition from MCO to SRO. The current operational environment (COE) and future threat assessments prove that this requirement will not dissipate. This monograph strives to determine the additional resources, training, and authority required by a U.S. Army division to successfully transition from MCO to SRO. The thesis investigates the experiences of three higher echelon headquarters, operating at the tactical level of war, required to make the transition. XVIII Airborne Corps during Operation Just Cause, 10th Mountain Division during Operation Uphold Democracy, and the 3rd Infantry Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The experiences of the three headquarters are contrasted with one another through an analysis of their actions with three of the principles of counterinsurgency: the establishment of security under the rule of law, the management of information and expectations, and support to the host nation. Findings suggest that division-level headquarters transitioning from MCO to SRO must have the authority of occupational law, the means to conduct mass information operations with the people of the host nation, and the capability to coincide efforts with those of the host nation government. The recommendations include the modification of doctrine to provide more guidance on transitions and better discern between the operational environments encountered during SRO. Additionally, division headquarters must ensure that their staffs are functionally aligned to conduct specific SRO tasks in the aftermath of MCO, immediately liaisoning with and supporting the host nation government. This requires the revision of Mission Essential Task Lists (METL) and home-station training focuses, for both divisional staff and subordinate units, to ensure success. Finally, as a precursor to any organizational changes, the conclusion recommends the changing of Army culture to embrace SRO as a traditional mission set.

ADA 470663 Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)